My purpose in this paper is merely to spell out just how the Narrative Practice Hypothesis, if true, undercuts any need to appeal to either theory or simulation when it comes to explaining the basis of folk psychological understanding: these heuristics do not come into play other than in cases of in which the framework is used to speculate about why another may have acted. The chapter discusses these issues, sets out the conditions for explicit control, and outlines some predictions of the proposed account. If we are systematically biased, how can we even form unbiased beliefs, and if we can form them, how can we make them effective? The dual-level view has implications for these questions, assigning a crucial role to metacognitive attitudes of certain kinds. The chapter then turns to the question of how we can overcome implicit bias. This suggests a layered picture of the human mind, with a passive implicit level supporting an active explicit one, and this dual-level view is fleshed out and compared briefly with other theories of mental duality. It then considers the relation between implicit bias and explicit belief, addressing a sceptical worry about the very existence of explicit belief and proposing an account of explicit belief as a form of commitment. It begins by locating implicit bias within a pattern of everyday talk about implicit mentality and arguing that systematic implicit bias is best thought of as an implicit form of belief. This chapter sketches a theoretical framework for thinking about implicit bias and how we can control it.
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